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BENEFICIAL OWNER'S LIABILITY FOR SHORT-SWING
PROFITS: JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
SECTION 16(b)'s EXEMPTION PROVISION
To facilitate liquidation and dissolution, Provident Securities Com-
pany (Provident) agreed to sell two-thirds of its assets to Foremost-
McKesson, Inc. (Foremost) for $54,000,000.00.1 After protracted ne-
gotiations an agreement was reached whereby Provident would receive
$4,250,000 cash and $49,750,000 in six percent, convertible subordi-
nated debentures issued by Foremost.2 As provided in the purchase
agreement, however, such debentures were not marketable without prior
written consent of Foremost unless registered under the Securities Act.
Foremost satisfied this registration requirement by filing an amended
Form S-1 registration statement3 with the Securities and Exchange
Commission regarding the sale of $25,000,000 of the aggregate. princi-
pal amount of the debentures.4
One week after the closing of the puichase agreement, an underwrit-
ing agreement covering the $25,000,000 aggregate principal amount of
the debentures was executed by Foremost, Provident, and as representa-
tive of the underwriting group, Dillion, Read & Company.5 Pursuant to
the underwriting agreement, delivery of $25,366,666.66 was made to
1. Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601,. 603 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1117 (1974).
2. Foremost-McKesson, for various reasons, including its desire to acquire liquid
assets in order to pursue other acquisitions, wanted to pay the major portion of the
purchase in its own securities issued expressly for that purpose. Provident argued that if
Foremost wanted to use securities to finance the purchase, it should sell them itself and
make payment to Provident in cash. Brief for Appellee at 3, Provident Sec. Co. v.
Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1117
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee].
3. Form S-1 is used to register the securities of all issuers under the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970). Its purpose is to inform investors of all material
information regarding the issuance. In general, Form S-1 requires disclosure of the
following information: (Part One) distribution spread (price to the public, underwriting
discounts, and commissions, proceeds to registrant), distribution plan, use of proceeds by
registrant purpose of the distribution, capital structure, summary of earnings, organiza-
tional identifications, stock description, principal holders of securities; (Part Two)
marketing arrangements, sales to special parties, recent sales of unregistered stock,
accompanying financial statements. See Securities Act of 1933, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g
(1970).
4. Form S-1 was filed with the SEC on September 29, 1969. Brief for Appellee, supra
note 2, at 6.
5. Brief for Appellee, supra note 2, at 9.
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Provident in exchange for the debentures. Subsequent to the realization
of the $366,666.66 profit, and in view of the fact that the debentures
were immediately convertible into common stock in an amount greater
than ten percent of Foremost's outstanding shares, Provident sought a
declaratory judgment as to its liability' for short-swing profits under
section 16(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934.7
In order to prevent the unfair use of inside information8 by statutory
insiders,' section 16(b) provides that any profits realized from the
purchase and sale of equity securities within a six-month period, by any
owner of more than ten percent of any class of such securities' 0 is con-
clusively presumed to be derived from inside information. Thus, the
6. Under section 16(b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970), a shareholder who
has determined that there has been a violation of the section must notify the corporation
and afford it an opportunity to bring an action. If no such action is brought within sixty
days of notification, the shareholder may bring a derivative action. The Securities and
Exchange Commission, thus, does not play the same type of role that it does in section
10(b) litigation.
7. Section 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970) provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by [a] beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale
and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted secu-
rity) within any period of less than six months, ...shall inure to and be recover-
able by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security pur-
chased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six
months. . . . This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction
where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale,
or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transac-
tions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not compre-
hended within the purpose of this subsection.
Section 16(b) should be read in conjunction with section 16(a) 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)
(1970), which provides the means for discovering a violation of section 16(b) :
Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10
per centum of any class of any equity security . . . or who is a director or an offi-
cer of the issuer of such security, shall file . . . a statement with the Commission
...of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the benefi-
cial owner ....
8. For purposes of this discussion, inside information is any data regarding any
corporate matter, acquired by reason of the recipient's relationship to the issuer, and
which is not available to the investing public.
9. For purposes of section 16(b), a statutory insider includes a "beneficial owner,
director, or officer who has access to insider information "by reason of his relationship
to the issuer."
10. The term "equity security" means any stock or similar security; or any security
convertible, with or without consideration, into such a security, or carrying any war-
rant or right to subscribe to or purchase such a security; or any such warrant or
right; or any other security which the Commission shall deem to be of similar na-
ture and consider necessary or appropriate, by such rules and regulations as it may
prescribe in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to treat as an
equity security.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(11) (1970).
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section mandates that any profits realized' be forfeited to the issuer,
irrespective of the beneficial owner's intention in regard to such pur-
chase and sale. The conclusive presumption, that the transaction was
based upon inside information, has the effect of lessening the burden
of proving actual misuse' 2 of information, necessary in the application
of rule lOb-5.' s
11. Section 16(b) reaches only the
"profit realized by him [i.e., the beneficial owner] from any purchase and sale, or
any sale and purchase of any equity security . . . ." Since profit on purchased
stock is not "realized" until its sale, this-the operative clause of the Section-
standing alone might be read as applying to profit realized by a person who was
a "beneficial owner" at the time of his sale, irrespective of his status as a beneficial
owner at the time of his prior purchase of the stock.
Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299, 303 (2d Cir.) (Hincks, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956). Based on Judge Hincks's interpretation, it would
appear that the entire transaction encompassed by section 16(b) must be read as one
transaction, including both the sale and the purchase, or the purchase and sale. See text
accompanying notes 62-67 infra.
12. Intent and motive under section 16(b) are inapplicable as defenses to actions
seeking disgorgement of resulting short-swing profits. The presumption created by section
16(b) is conclusive insofar as it regards the intention or expectation of speculative abuse
based on inside information. See Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506
F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1117 (1975). This conclusive
presumption should be distinguished from the section's presumption that "officers,
directors and 10-percent shareholders fall within the class of persons who may reasona-
bly be expected to have access to inside information . . . ." 506 F.2d at 612. This latter
presumption is rebuttable. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411
U.S. 582 (1973).
Although it does not appear that the question has yet been raised in any judicial
proceeding, it might be argued that the conclusive presumption created by section 16(b)
is unconstitutional in its across-the-board application. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Department of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 528 (1973);
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). In those cases, the Court invalidated state
statutes with presumptions similar to that of section 16(b), on due process, rather than
equal protection, grounds. Since it is possible that a person could acquire more than
ten percent of an issuer's securities without having had inside information, it would ap-
pear that the section is over-inclusive. Conversely, a person who has acquired more than
ten percent of an issuer's securities, on the basis of inside information, but does not make
a sale of such securities until one day after six months from the time of purchase, would
not be held liable under the section. Another instance in which the section would ap-
pear to be under-inclusive, is Provident's reading of "at the time of" as meaning "prior
to." It is possible that a person might have had inside information prior to the acquisi-
tion giving him ten percent ownership but would not be held liable. Under such circum-
stances, it could be argued that the statute is under-inclusive. Further, to treat the above
mentioned instances as subject to section 16(b) would be contrary to the express purpose
of the section which is designed to prevent abuses of inside information obtained because
of one's relationship to the issuer. But see Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
It has been suggested that the presumption of section 16(b) be amended to provide a
rebuttable presumption that there was an abuse of inside information for any transac-
tions, by a beneficial owner, within one year. Munter, Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: An Alternative to "Burning Down the Barn in Order to Kill the
Rats," 52 CoiNu. L.Q. 69 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Munter].
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In examining both the purpose behind the statute and the abuses it
sought to prevent, the district court in Provident Securities v. Foremost-
McKesson, Inc.14 agreed with those courts which "have not felt required
to apply § 16(b) in all cases regardless of concomitant equities and cir-
cumstances," and rejected a mechanical application of the rule. 15 Based
upon the facts presented, in particular that Foremost had controlled the
essential details of the transaction, the court found there existed no real
potential for speculative abuse of inside information.1" The court con-
cluded:
To allow Foremost under these circumstances to recover the small profit
. . . simply by a mindlessly literal application of Section 16(b) would
be to perpetuate rather than correct an inequity. 7
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's determi-
nation that there was no potential for speculative abuse. 8 Nonetheless, it
affirmed the decision on the ground that Provident was not within the
class of persons to whom section 16(b)'s conclusive presumption was
intended to apply.19 The court adopted the position that the purchase by
13. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a ma-
terial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1973). Rule 10b-5, which requires an actual showing that a person
has violated the statute, is available as a cause of action for abuses of inside information
not actionable under section 16(b). See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d
90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
SEC 907 (1961).
14. 331 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 506 F.2d 601 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1117 (1975).
15. Id. at 791. The court further stated:
"We believe that each case must be examined on its own facts and [Section 16(b)]
only applied when these facts disclose the possibility of abuses that the Act were
'[sic] designed to prevent"
Id., quoting Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 533 (8th Cir. 1966).
16. Id. at 792.
17. Id.
18. 506 F.2d 601, 605 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1117 (1975).
19. Id. at 614. The court initially examined the question of when the sale of the
debentures was completed. Stating that such a determination for purpose of section 16(b)
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which one becomes a ten percent beneficial owner may not form the
basis for the application of the section, even though a profitable sale
occurs within six months. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit adopted a
position that differs sharply with the Second2" and Eighth Circuits. 21
A prerequisite to the proper application of section 16(b) is an
understanding of legislative intent underlying the statute. In its em-
bryonic stages section 16(b) was only intended by its drafters to be a
"crude rule of thumb. 22 It was not intended to prevent all abuses of
inside information,23 but rather, only those abuses "which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of
his relationship to the issuer. . . ...4 Thus, if the transactor is not an
insider, his "outsider" status bars the opportunity for speculative abuse
prohibited by the section and removes the transaction from the section's
purview.
To effectuate this congressional intent, close scrutiny has been given
to the provision of section 16(b) which specifically exempts any transac-
is to be decided according to federal law, the court relied on other cases which had
sought to determine at what point "the insider ha[d] relinquished his ability to control
the transaction to the extent that he no longer has the potential to use inside information
. " Id. at 606, citing Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965). Accordingly, since Provident became bound on October 21,
by the terms and conditions of the agreement, the sale was completed on that date. The
purchase and sale therefore occurred within six months. Id. at 607.
20. See Perine v. William Norton & Co:, 509 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1974); Newmark v.
RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970);
Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), affg in part and
remanding in part, 132 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), recognizing as the law of the
case 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
21. Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970), aff'd 464
U.S. 418 (1972). But see Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. W.R. Stevens Inv. Co., 141 F.
Supp. 841 (W.D. Ark. 1956), where it was held that where an investment company
which owned more than ten percent of the stock in a gas company purchased stock in the
gas company at prevailing market prices and in turn filled orders of customers, the
transactions were purchases and sales within the provision of the Securities Exchange
Act authorizing recovery of profit made by officers, directors or shareholders of the
corporation from short-term trading in the corporate securities. Id. at 841. In deciding
whether the original purchase should be used in computing recoverable profits, the court
cited Judge Hincks's dissent in Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299, 302
(2d Cir. 1956) (see text accompanying notes 60-61 infra), and thus concluded that the
original purchase should not be considered in computing the recoverable profits.
22. Hearings on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6557 (1934) (testimony by Mr. Thomas
G. Corcoran) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. The Provident District Court also called
it an "extremely crude rule of a most deformed and misshapen thumb." 331 F. Supp. at
792.
23. See notes 41-47, 50-61 infra and accompanying text.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
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tion by beneficial owners25 holding less than a ten percent interest "both
at the time of the purchase and sale." The specific issue examined by the
Provident court was whether the initial purchase of at least ten percent
of an issuer's outstanding shares will subject the purchaser to liability
under the section upon a subsequent profitable sale. Although the
subject of numerous law review articles, 26 the correct construction of the
exemption provision has been analyzed by only a handful of cases.
The first decision construing the phrase "at the time of" was Stella v.
Graham-Paige Motors Corporation .27 The court found that the phrase
was to be interpreted as ownership "simultaneously with" the purchase
and sale. There, the defendant-corporation had considerable holdings in
Kaiser-Frazer Corporation, which were reduced below ten percent of the
outstanding shares by issuances subsequent to defendant's original ac-
quisition. Thereafter, an additional acquisition once again conferred
beneficial ownership status on Graham-Paige. Less than six months
later, defendant sold a portion of its holdings, but still maintained
beneficial ownership status. A stockholder of Kaiser-Frazer brought suit
for violations of section 16(b) to recover the profits realized.
The defendant contended that the language "at the time of" required
25. While section 16(b) is applicable to directors, officers and beneficial owners, the
exemption provision applies only to beneficial owners. See Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d
840 (2d Cir. 1959) (one who is a director at the time of sale need not also have been a
director at the time of purchase). In deciding whether an investor is an officer or
director within the meaning of section 16(b), courts have allowed proof that the investor
performed the functions of an officer or director even though not formally denominated
as such. Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1949); cf. Feder v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 262-63 (2d Cir. 1969). The various tests employed in these cases
are used to determine whether a transaction falls within or without the terms of the
statute. In no case is liability predicated upon "considerations of intent, lack of motive,
or improper conduct" which are irrelevant in section 16(b) actions. Blau v. Oppenheim,
250 F. Supp. 881, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See note 12 supra. For a discussion of the
liability of officers and directors under section 16(b) see Meeker & Cooney, The
Problem of Definition in Determining Insider Liabilities under Section 16(b), 45 VA. L.
REv. 949 (1959); Wentz, Refining a Crude Rule: The Pragmatic Approach to Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 221, 253-60 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Wentz]; Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and
Stockholders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 MICH. L. REy. (1939).
26. See Munter, supra note 12; Note, Is the Purchase By Which One Becomes a Ten
Percent Beneficial Owner a Statutory Purchase Within the Meaning of Section 16(b)?, 7
RtrroEns-C A. L.J 104 (1975); Note, Short-Swing Profits and the Ten-Percent Rule, 9
STAN. L. REV. 582 (1957); Comment, Section 16(b): An Alternative Approach to the
Six-Month Limitation Period, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1289 (1973).
27. 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), recognized as law of the case, 132 F. Supp.
100 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956). For comments on the Stella case, see 57 COLUM. L. REv.
287 (1957); 70 HRv. L. R.v. 1312 (1957).
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that when 16(b) liability is predicated upon a purchase/sale transaction,
beneficial ownership status must exist prior to the initiating transaction.
The court rejected this contention,2 8 holding instead that section 16(b)
includes a transaction where the purchase leading to the short-swing
profit is also the very purchase which makes the stockholder a ten
percent owner.2" According to its interpretation, the language of 16(b)
only requires that beneficial ownership exist "simultaneously with" both
the purchase and sale. 0 "Simultaneously with" does not require an in-
dividual, once he or she is a ten percent owner, to make another pur-
chase and then a sale for liability to attach. Since the defendant owned
ten percent both at the time of the initial purchase and subsequent sale,
liability could attach within the meaning of the section.
The court noted that the section itself fails to qualify "at the time of,"
but nonetheless thought the congressional intent underlying the enact-
ment of the section was clear in evidencing a purpose of protecting
outside stockholders against short-swing speculation by insiders with
advance information. 31 The court supported its decision by reference to
a hypothetical. However, while the reasoning evidenced by this applica-
tion appears facially sound, the hypothetical raises a problem inherent in
the Stella interpretation of "at the time of."
The court posited that a situation could exist where an individual
purchasing more than ten percent and selling his holdings to below ten
percent, repeating the process ad infinitum, would not be subject to
liability since prior to each purchase he was not a ten percent owner.
32
28. 104 F. Supp. at 959.
29. Id. at 960.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 959. In so concluding, the court relied on two prior cases: Shaw v. Dreyfus,
172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1949) and Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.
1947). In Shaw, it was contended that a stockholder's receipt of rights by virtue of
corporate resolution was a "purchase" of such rights within the intent of section 16(b).
This argument was denied. The court noted that the statutes purpose was to protect the
outside stockholders against at least short-swing speculation by insiders with advance
information. Inside information which the directors might have had could not possibly
have been used to the detriment of other stockholders. In voting to grant rights to all
stockholders of record in proportion to their existing holdings, all were treated equally.
172 F.2d at 142. In Schulte, the court was involved with majority stockholders' con-
version, pursuant to an option contained in their preferred stock, of preferred shares
into common, followed by a sale within six months. In holding that this constituted an
"acquisition, purchase and sale" within the Act, the court pointed out that the congres-
sional purpose behind the section was to protect the outside stockholder against at least
short-swing speculation by insiders with advance information. 160 F.2d at 987. But see
Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
32. 104 F. Supp. at 959.
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In the court's hypothetical situation, however, the shareholder's benefi-
cial ownership status terminated with the closing transaction. Under the
Stella analysis, which construes the terms "both at the time of purchase
and sale" as meaning simultaneously with both the purchase and sale, an
individual who is a ten percent owner and who sells down to below ten
percent could not be held liable since "simultaneously with" the sale he
was not a beneficial owner. This anomaly was specifically noted by the
court in Emerson Electric Co. v. Reliance Electric Co.3
There, Emerson Electric Company had acquired 13.2 percent owner-
ship in Dodge, a small manufacturing concern, as part of its attempt to
block a proposed merger between Dodge and Reliance. When the mer-
ger was approved, Emerson liquidated its holdings in two separate sales,
the first of which reduced its ownership ,to below ten percent. 84 Both
sales occurred within six months of the initial acquisition and Reliance
brought suit for violation of section 16(b). While the court concluded
that no liability derived from the second sale,"5 it did impose liability for
the profits realized by the first sale."0
In so holding, the court adopted the Stella position that "at the time
of' did not mean "prior to," but "simultaneously with" the purchase. It
agreed with Stella that a purchase by which one becomes a ten percent
shareholder is within section 16(b).317 Liability was imposed on Emer-
son, notwithstanding the fact that it was not a beneficial owner simulta-
neously with the sale as that phrase was defined in Stella.8 8 The court
33. 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970), affd 404 U.S. 418 (1972). When Emerson was
before the Supreme Court, it was noted there was an issue as to the proper definition of
"at the time of," but the Court did not decide this issue. 404 U.S. at 421.
34. 434F.2d at 921.
35. Id. at 926. In finding no liability attached to the second sale, the court applied
the section literally. First, the court noted that a person may purposely avoid the
proscription of section 16(b) by selling down to below ten percent without incurring
liability. Second, the court could not find any congressional intention which would
require it to treat the two sales as one transaction. The court stated:
[W]e have determined as a matter of law that intent as such to avoid loss of re-
alized profits by engaging in two independent sales not legally tied to each other
and made at different times to different buyers . . . does not result in treating the
two sales as one sale of the entire stock held, nor as one continuous transaction
Id. This portion of the Emerson holding was affirmed by the Supreme Court over a
strong dissent by Justice Douglas. 404 U.S. at 427 (1972). The language of the circuit
court implicitly left open the question of whether two sales made either at the same time
or to the same buyer could be considered as one transaction.
36. 434 F.2d at 923, 924.
37. Id. at 923.
38. One might argue that such an individual is a beneficial owner "simultaneously
with" the sale. However, as that phrase was applied to the purchases in Stella and
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did not appear to be bothered by the fact that Stella was an express
rejection of a "prior to" interpretation and created a question of
whether one is a beneficial owner at the time of a closing sale when
such sale terminates beneficial ownership status.
Without expressly dealing with the issue, the court resolved the prob-
lem by first noting that "at the time of' could have several meanings."
It then reasoned:
It is doubtful that Congress intended [the phrase] to have one of those
meanings in every situation. Therefore, without departing from the
statute the words "at the time of" might mean "immediately before?' in
the case of a purchase and "simultaneously with" in the case of a re-
purchase.
40
In view of this, it interpreted the Stella court to hold that "simulta-
neously with" in regards to a purchase meant just after the purchase and
just before the sale.
Against this background of previous judicial interpretations, the
Provident court was confronted with a situation where an initial pur-
chase conferred beneficial ownership status and the subsequent sale re-
sulted in a total divestiture of the stock holdings. As in Stella and
Reliance, the court looked to the congressional intent behind the enact-
ment of section 16(b) for guidance in determining if the initial transac-
tion could give rise to the application of the section.41 The court noted
that
the section was designed to deter insiders from purchasing stock without
any intention of making a long-term investment, but only with the inten-
tion of profiting from upward fluctuations in the market price that were
predictable on the basis of inside information.
42
Therefore, the court concluded that liability under the section could
attach only when a person could be presumed to have had inside
information in making the decision as to both the initial and closing
transactions.
The court then examined the presumption created by section 16(b),
Emerson, it in effect means "immediately after." As noted by the Seventh Circuit in
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., CCH 1975 FED. SFC. L. RFP.
95,308, at 98,550-01 n.8 (7th Cir. Sept 29, 1975), there is no distinction between
'simultaneously with" and "immediately after."
39. "[The phrase] may refer to a condition existing either 'immediately before,'
'simultaneously with' or 'immediately after' a given event." 434 F.2d at 922-23.
40. Id. at 923 (footnote omitted).
41. 506 F.2d at 609-14.
42. Id. at 609.
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positing that a proper application of this presumption was in accord
with its interpretation that "at the time of" meant "prior to." The con-
gressional intent, the court believed, made it clear that the presumption
under the section was to arise only when one has substantial stockhold-
ings and, thus, could be said to have obtained inside information by
"reason of his relationship to the issuer."'4s Furthermore, since the pre-
sumption under the section is conclusive, the class of persons deemed to
be insiders under the statute must be narrowly construed."
Since one who is an outsider prior to the initial transaction cannot be
said to have had inside information,45 it is necessary to first determine
whether the person had the status of an insider prior to the initial
transaction. If such status exists and if the person engages in a closing
transaction within six months,4" -then such person is conclusively pre-
sumed to have acted on the basis of his relationship to the issuer, and
thus on the basis of inside information.47 Since the Provident court
determined that at the time of its initial transaction Provident was not a
statutory insider, it necessarily followed that it did not act on the basis of
inside information both at the time of the purchase and sale.
While the court's conclusion that "at the time of" required a person to
be a beneficial owner "prior to" the initiating transaction disposed of the
issue of Provident's liability, the court went on to clarify its holding.
Recognizing that its interpretation "should not be applied to a transac-
tion that is not an initial purchase but in reality is a repurchase or a
closing transaction,"" the court made it clear that the term "prior to"
was to be applied only to the initiating transaction, whether a purchase
or a sale. The court emphasized that this "prior to" interpretation was
not to be applied to closing transactions. Rather, in the context of such
transactions, "at the time of' should be interpreted to mean "simul-
taneously with."4 9
43. Id. at 614. See Note, Short-Swing Profits and the Ten-Percent Rule, 9 STAN. L.
REv. 582 (1957).
44. 506 F.2d at 611. See also notes 12-19 supra and accompanying text.
45. See notes 58-61 infra and accompanying text.
46. See Comment, Section 16(b): An Alternative Approach to the Six-Month Limita-
tion Period, 20 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 1289 (1973).
47. See note 12 supra.
48. 506 F.2d at 614.
49. Id. The court's reasoning may be exemplified by the following two situations: (1)
where X owns no stock of ABC Corporation, but purchases a ten percent interest and
within six months of such purchase makes a sale, no liability can attach since "prior to"
the purchase X was not a beneficial owner; (2) where X owns ten percent of ABC
Corporation, sells to five percent, and within six months of such sale repurchases to over
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That Provident is correct in holding that a court must look to the time
prior to the initiating transaction in determining if a person is an insider
is supported by the Supreme Court case of Kern County Land Company
v. Occidental Petroleum Corporation.50 There, pursuant to a tender of-
fer made on May 8, 1967, Occidental acquired beneficial ownership
status in Kern. 51 On May 11, an extension of Occidental's tender offer
resulted in further acquisitions. Within six months of the original tender
offer, Occidental executed an agreement with Tenneco, Inc., which had
successfully merged with Kern, giving Tenneco an option to purohase
Occidental's holdings.
52
Although concerned primarily with the issue of whether the transac-
tions were a purchase and sale for purposes of section 16(b),5" the
Court did give some indication as to what point in the transaction it is
necessary to determine if insider status exists. The Court stated that an
initial determination must be made in section 16(b) cases of whether
or not there exists the potential for speculative abuse of inside informa-
tion in the purchase/sale or sale/purchase transactions.5 4 In making this
ten percent, X is liable, since "prior to" its sale, and "simultaneously with" its repurchase
X was a beneficial owner.
50. 411 U.S. 582 (1975).
51. Id. at 584.
52. Id. at 585-86.
53. The Court decided the case on the basis of the interpretation to be given to "sale
and purchase" rather than delving into the interpretation to be given to "at the time of."
The Court stated that
one or more statutory purchases occur when one company, seeking to gain control
of another, acquires more than a ten percent interest in the corporation through a
tender offer made to its shareholders. But is it a § 16(b) "sale" when the target of
the tender offer defends itself by merging into a third company and the tender of-
feror then exchanges his stock for the stock of the surviving company, also granting
an option to purchase the latter stock that is not exercisable within the statutory
six-month period?
411 U.S. at 584.
54. The Court in Kern determined that section 16(b) was not automatically applica-
ble to all short-swing transactions but only those which presented the potential for
speculative abuse of inside information. To this end, the Court stated, a distinction must
be made between orthodox and unorthodox transactions. The former are those in which
a stock-for-cash or cash-for-stock exchange is made. These transactions require no
further analysis but are presumed to involve the potential for speculative abuse. 411 U.S.
at 593. Unorthodox transactions consist of "stock conversions, exchanges pursuant
to mergers and other corporate reorganizations, stock reclassification, and dealings in
options, rights, and warrants." Id. at 593 n.24. In these transactions an examination must
be made to determine if a potential for speculative abuse actually exists. Id. at 595.
The Kern Court postulated two factors, both of which must exist in determining if an
unorthodox transaction presented the requisite abuse that the statute was designed to
prevent. The factors are: (1) whether, at the time the transaction commenced, the
"insider" had an opportunity to acquire inside information; and (2) whether the
"insider" entered into the transaction voluntarily. 411 U.S. at 596-97, 599-600. Applying
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determination in regard to Occidental's dealings, the Court noted that
prior to its May 1 1th extension of the tender offer Occidental had ac-
this criteria to the transaction in Kern, the Court concluded that
the involuntary nature of Occidental's exchange, when coupled with the absence of
the possibility of speculative abuse of inside information, convinces us that § 16(b)
should not apply to transactions such as this one.
Id. at 600. Other factors a court may wish to consider under this pragmatic approach
include: (1) whether the transaction was consummated on a stock exchange; and (2)
the benefit that would inure to the individual by the use of inside information. See
Wentz, supra note 25, at 229-30 nn. 23 & 24.
The Court thereby adopted a "pragmatic" approach to section 16(b). Several courts
and commentators have stated that such an approach best comports with the achievement
of statutory goals. See, e.g., Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959); Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 827 (1954). See also Gadsby & Treadway, Recent Developments Under Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 N.Y.L.F. 687 (1971); Lowenfels,
Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 CORNELL L.Q. 45
(1968); Comment, Stock Exchanges Pursuant to Corporate Consolidation: A Section
16(b) "Purchase or Sale?," 119 U. PA. L. REv. 1034 (1969).
The Provident court initially concluded that the "threshold test" of Kern was inappli-
cable since the transaction was orthodox. The only distinction between the Provident-
Foremost transaction and the usual cash-for-stock sale, the court commented, was the
nature of the consideration. 506 F.2d at 601. However, the court's characterization of the
transaction is not supported when analyzed in light of SEC rule 16(b)-9, 17 C.F.R. §
240.16(b)-9. This rule provides that where the purchase of a convertible security and the
sale of the underlying stock are separated by more than six months, no liability will arise
from the transaction. Notwithstanding the time limitation, rule 16(b)-9 evidences that
such transactions are to be characterized as non-cash because they may be exempted.
The Provident court, in finding that the potentially convertible debentures bestowed
beneficial ownership status on Provident, treated the conversion as exercised. This
fictionalized exercise not only subjected the transaction to section 16(b), but also, in
view of rule 16(b)-9, provided a non-cash characterization to the transaction, i.e., it was
an unorthodox transaction.
Perhaps anticipating that its holding on this question was not particularly strong, the
court went on to analyze the transaction as unorthodox under the Kern analysis. The
court stated that under section 16(b) Congress mandated that any ten percent sharehold-
er be presumed to have access to inside information. Additionally, there was no question
that Provident entered into the transaction voluntarily. Therefore the requisites under the
Kern analysis were met. 506 F.2d at 605.
There is a significant internal inconsistency in the court's analysis on this point. In the
subsequent portion of the opinion in which the court discussed the question of whether
the initiating transaction could be considered in imposing liability under section 16(b),
the court found that Provident was an outsider. This determination led to the conclu-
sions that Provident could not have utilized any inside information acquired by reason of
its relationship to Foremost. 506 F.2d at 614. It is questionable whether the court could
determine if the Kern threshold had been met before a determination of the status of the
parties. If an individual is an outsider there is no potential for the speculative abuse of
inside information and thus one of the factors considered in Kern is lacking. Since the
Provident court ultimately determined that no potential for speculative abuse existed,
then, if the transaction was in fact unorthodox, there was no need for the court to
determine if the initiating transaction could give rise to liability under section 16(b).
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quired more than ten percent ownership. By examining the extension
of the tender as of May 1 1,c as opposed to the date of the original
tender offer by which Occidental acquired beneficial ownership, the
Court impliedly recognized that one must be a beneficial owner prior
to the initiating transaction, i.e., the initial decision to purchase must
be based on inside information. Having focused on the May 11 th trans-
action, the Court concluded that section 16(b) was not applicable to
Occidental's dealings. Even though Occidental may have been able
to conclude, at the time it made its purchase, that it would be able to
sell the stock at a profit, these
[c]alculations . . . [did] not represent the kind of speculative abuse
at which the statute is aimed, for they could not have been based on
inside information obtained from substantial stockholdings that did not
yet exist.50
Based on its analysis of Kern, the Ninth Circuit stated:
since a person making a decision to purchase enough stock to increase
his holdings to 10 percent of a corporation's outstanding shares could
not have made that decision "based on inside information obtained from
substantial stockholdings," the Court must have intended for section 16
(b) to apply only after that person becomes a statutory insider.
57
In view of this analysis, the Stella decision, that one who is not an
insider prior to the initial transaction may be subject to 16(b) liability,
in effect holds that the potential for speculative abuse does not have to
exist in the initiating transaction. This is contrary, however, to the
language and purpose of the section.
As Provident pointed out, Congress intended 16(b) not to be appli-
cable to outsiders. This is evidenced by the fact that the initial draft of
section 16(b)58 provided that profits received by outsiders from short-
55. 411 U.S. at 598.
56. Id. at 597.
57. Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601, 609 (9th Cir.
1974), quoting Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 597
(1973).
58. At one point prior to its passage, section 16(b) read:
It shall be unlawful for any director, officer, or owner of securities, owning as of
record and/or beneficially more than five per centum of any class of stock of any
issuer, any security of which is registered on a national securities exchange-
(3) To disclose, directly or indirectly, any confidential information regarding or af-
fecting any such registered security not necessary or proper to be disclosed as part
of his corporate duties. Any profits made by any person, to whom such unlawful
disclosure shall have been made, in respect of any transaction or transactions in
such registered security within a period not exceeding six months after such dis-
closure shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer unless such person shall have
1975]
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swing speculation entered into on the basis of confidential information
received from insiders could be recovered by the issuer. This provision
was deleted from the final draft.59 Such deletion, without material
change in other subsections, evidences congressional intent to exclude
outsiders from the applicability of section 16(b).
Judge Hincks, dissenting in Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors,00 empha-
sized that congressional intent required a rejection of the Stella interpre-
tation of "at the time of" because it made the exemption inoperative. He
reasoned that, without the exemption, liability could be imposed for any
sale so long as one was a beneficial owner at the time of the sale,
regardless of his status at the time of the initiating transaction. According
to Judge Hincks, the majority's adoption of the district court's interpre-
tation of section 16(b) leading to the imposition of liability in the case,
forced the court to commit itself to one of two propositions:
(a) that any purchase by an outsider of a 10% interest in a stock
equity gives rise to a conclusive presumption that the purchaser had in-
side information as to the affairs of the corporation, or (b) that a sale
for profit by a "beneficial owner" of stock in his corporation may give
rise to a conclusive presumption of a breach of fiduciary duty even
though the seller was under no fiduciary duty at all when he had previ-
ously purchased the stock sold.61
Both of these propositions were rejected by Judge Hincks. First, they
were expressly contrary to the clear and unambiguous language of the
statute. Second, the legislative history was clear that such results were
not intended. Thus, based on Judge Hincks's analysis, as well as the
congressional history surrounding section 16(b), it would appear that
the Provident court was correct in its holding.
However, the court's conclusion that the section requires one to be a
beneficial owner simultaneously with the closing transaction appears to
be based on the unfounded premise that, for purposes of the section, the
transactions must be viewed as separate occurrences. Such a view ap-
pears to be contrary to the language of the statute requiring a court to
examine the purchase/sale or sale/purchase as one transaction in order
had no reasonable ground to believe that the disclosure was confidential or was
made not in the performance of corporate duties.
Hearings, supra note 22, at 6430.
59. Apparently, the reason for such deletion was the difficulty of proof involved with
establishing a violation of section 16(b) on the basis of inside information. Id. at 6560-
61.
60. 232 F.2d 299, 302 (2d Cir.) (Hincks, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831
(1956).
61. Id. at 303-04.
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to determine if the insider dealings could involve a potential for specula-
tive abuse.
Recently, in Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company v. Gulf & West-
ern Industries, Inc.,62 the Seventh Circuit stated that such an examina-
tion is required for the proper application of the section. There the court
agreed with Provident that in order for liability to attach one must be a
beneficial owner prior to the initial transaction which gives rise to the
liability. 3 However, the court rejected Provident's bifurcated approach
which provided a "simultaneously with" interpretation of "at the time
of" as applied to the closing transaction. As the court stated:
While we agree with much of the analysis in the Ninth Circuit decision
in Provident, we are convinced that a fundamental conceptual error, in-
itiated in the Stella decision, has survived even the careful analysis in
Provident. It is our view that the legislative history of section 16(b)
provides ample support for a construction of that section which obviates
any necessity, under any circumstances, to attribute to Congress an in-
tent to utilize a chameleonic definition of the simple phrase "at the time
of."
64
The court based its holding on changes incorporated in the final draft
of section 16(b). Originally, the section imposed liability for "any
transaction" by an insider within a period of "less than six months."65
Thus, Congress deemed a purchase/sale transaction to be one single
transaction. The purchase/sale and sale/purchase language was includ-
ed in the revised version to make it clear that a sale/purchase transac-
62. CCH 1975 FeD. SEC. L. REP. 95,308 (7th Cir. Sept. 29, 1975). In Allis-
Chalmers, Gulf & Western sought an acquisition of Allis-Chalmers. An exchange offer
was made by Gulf & Western, by which it acquired more than ten percent of Allis'
outstanding stock. Shortly thereafter, Gulf & Western purchased an additional amount of
shares, giving as consideration some of its own warrants. Within six months, Gulf &
Western sold all of its Allis holdings at a substantial profit. Allis sought to recover these
profits, alleging they were the result of the use of inside information. Gulf & Western
responded that at the time it made its initial acquisition it was not a beneficial owner,
and thus outside section 16(b). Although the court found Gulf & Western to be outside
the scope of the statute in regard to its first purchase, it did assess liability for the profit
realized on the second acquisition.
63. Id. at 98,554.
64. Id. at 98,553.
65. The early draft provided:
(b) It shall be unlawful for any [beneficial owner]
(1) To purchase any such registered security with the intention or expectation
of selling the same security within six months; and any profit made by such person
on any transaction in such a registered security extending over a period of less than
six months shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any inten-
tion or expectation on his part in entering into such transaction of holding the se-
curity purchased for a period exceeding six months.
Quoted in id. at 95,553-54.
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tion would fall within the section. The court concluded that the differ-
ences between the initial draft of 16(b) and the finalized version of the
section indicate that Congress intended the entire transaction to be
examined to determine if there existed a potential for speculative abuse.
Section 16(b) does not require and was never intended to require a
court to examine the series of transactions separately.60
Thus, it was unnecessary to have an independent examination of the
"insider's intention 'in entering into such transaction,' [and] would
indicate that Congress still meant to focus on insider status 'prior to' the
unitary transaction in question and not 'simultaneously with' the initial
step in that transaction, as suggested in Stella and later cases. '0 7
CONCLUSION
To prevent unfair abuse of inside information, section 16(b)
provides that any profits realized by a party from a transaction within a
six month period shall be paid to the issuer regardless of any intention to
make use of such information. Because the presumption created by the
statute is conclusive, courts have applied this section with an aim
toward avoiding "purposeless harshness."68
Although the courts agree that section 16(b) should be read in
order to best effectuate congressional intent, a split among the circuit
courts has developed as to how the section should be applied in order to
effectuate that purpose. A key divergence in opinion has evolved con-
cerning when the section becomes operative. In the Ninth Circuit, at
least, -the section is to be read as creating dual-transactions. Insofar as
the initial transaction is concerned, the section is not applicable unless a
party is a beneficial owner prior to the time of that transaction. This
accords with congressional intent that the statute is operative only be-
cause of one's relationship to the issuer. Since Provident, prior to its
consummation of the Foremost exchange, had no relationship with the
latter, it was deemed to be an outsider, and thus outside the provisions
of the section. However, the Provident court erroneously held that such
person must be a beneficial owner "simultaneously with" the closing
transaction. Because such an analysis requires the court to make a sepa-
66. Id. at 98,554.
67.. Id.
68. Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 519 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002
(1967). See Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
892 (1965).
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rate determination as to the status of the party at the time of the clos-
ing transaction, the Provident court interpreted the statute contrary to
the express language of the section.
Daryl L. Smith
